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In the Wake of Disaster:
Resilient Organizing and a New Path for the Future
A. Erin Bass and Ivana Milosevic

Abstract
High-hazard organizations are unique due to their susceptibility to disasters that can have grave
consequences not just for the organization, but also for stakeholders, the communities in which
they operate and the environment. Though prominence is placed on understanding how highhazard organizations avoid such events, how they create a new future when such an event does
occur is underexplored. The purpose of this chapter, thus, is to investigate how organizations
create a new future in the wake of a disaster through resilient organizing. Using an instrumental
case study methodology, this study investigates how executives at BP, a high-hazard
organization, embodied resilient organizing following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We
show how resilient organizing helped BP bounce back and beyond by learning from the disaster,
finding resolve, refocusing and experiencing transformation through action. In doing so, BP
endeavored to prepare for, build, cultivate and commit to a new future. Insights from this
research point to resilient organizing as a promising strategy for creating a new future and
suggest future avenues for research on resilient organizing in high-hazard contexts and beyond.

Draft only. For final version see: Bass, A. E., & Milosevic, I. (2018). In the Wake of Disaster:
Resilient Organizing and a New Path for the Future. In How Organizations Manage the
Future (pp. 193-214). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
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Introduction
Increased environmental complexity has led some to argue that organizations exist in a
perpetual state of crisis (Davis et al. 2009; Hannah et al. 2009). Indeed, in addition to
institutional and competitive dynamics (Chen and Miller 2015; Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001),
organizations today face natural as well as manmade disasters (Van Der Vegt et al. 2015). From
the financial crisis that shocked the world to near-annual natural disasters, to the BP oil spill
and the GM and Volkswagen recalls, it seems that corporate crises are an ongoing concern.
Understanding how organizations experience and recover from a disaster may be needed now
more than ever.
Previous research has suggested that when faced with an uncertain future and a high probability
for disaster, organizations should either shield their core via emphasis on activities that maintain
equilibrium (Meyer et al. 2005; Voss et al. 2008) or, alternatively, embrace an uncertain future
through complex organizing and careful interweaving of administrative and innovative
practices (Uhl-Bien and Marion 2009). The former perspective — focused on maintaining
equilibrium —suggests that organizations develop slack resources (Daniel et al. 2004; Wang et
al. 2016) and boundary-spanning departments (Aldrich and Herker 1977; Foss et al. 2013) to
buffer the organization from uncertainty. The latter perspective — focused on complex
organizing —suggests that organizations develop dynamic capabilities (Barreto 2010; Helfat
and Martin 2015; Schilke 2014), entangle administrative and adaptive functions (Uhl-Bien and
Marion 2009), or engage in ambidextrous organizing (Raisch et al. 2009) to embrace, rather
than shield from uncertainty.
Both of these views suggest that organizing — either via equilibrium maintenance or
complexity — is critical for maintaining successful performance in the face of an uncertain
future. Though both literatures build on the assumption that organizations are capable of
withstanding uncertainty, it is less clear how to organize when the future is punctuated by a
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devastating disaster, such as those mentioned above, especially when the disaster completely
obliterates any opportunity for business as usual. Despite creating devastating consequences
and uncertainty, the disaster may also create a new future for the organization. To this end, we
utilize insights from the resilient organizing literature (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011) to explore how
organizations bounce back and even beyond post-disaster to chart a new path for the future.

Resilient Organizing
Resilient organizing is critical for a contemporary organization’s ability to confront, absorb and
adapt to unplanned organizational events (Meyer 1982; Williams et al. 2017; Weick and
Sutcliffe 2011). It embodies ‘the process by which an actor (i.e. individual, organization or
community) builds and uses its capability endowments to interact with the environment in a
way that positively adjusts and maintains functioning prior to, during, and following adversity’
(Williams et al. 2017, p. 742). Resilient organizing is characterized by three key elements. First,
resilient organizing involves positive adjustments under difficult conditions (Lengnick-Hall et
al. 2011; Luthans et al. 2007). These positive adjustments entail confidence in the
organization’s ability to bounce back and optimism that a new path for the future can be
uncovered and pursued. Second, resilient organizing involves redefining success based on the
new reality that the disaster creates (Lengnick-Hall et al. 2011). The effort here is on
reestablishing a fit between the organization and the new environment through focusing on
behaviors and activities that strengthen this fit, and shedding behaviors and activities that
detract from it (Quinn and Worline 2008). Third, resilient organizing involves hardiness, or the
organization’s ability to experience and navigate the disaster (Mamouni Limnios et al. 2014;
Kobasa et al. 1982). In this vein, resilient organizing compels organizations to experience the
disaster (Weick and Sutcliffe 2011) and find resolution in achieving organization–environment
fit in the new, post-disaster reality (Williams et al. 2017).
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Although literature on resilient organizing implies that organizations will build a new future
post-disaster when they embody resilient organizing (Weick and Sutcliffe 2011), the relation
between resilient organizing and organizing for the future has not been systematically explored.
Building on the previous literature (Lengnick-Hall et al. 2011; Mamouni Limnios et al. 2014;
Weick and Sutcliffe 2011), we endeavor to uncover how resilient organizing in the wake of a
disaster enabled a high-hazard organization to build a new future. In the subsequent section, we
present an instrumental case study of BP’s post-disaster activities following the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in 2010 to explicate how BP embodied resilient organizing to create a new
future. We describe BP as a high-hazard (Perrow 1984), rather than a high-reliability (Wieck
and Roberts 1993) organization because, in the period before the disaster, BP did not embody
the key elements of high-reliability: a preoccupation with failure, system-wide processes focused
on reliability, and a strong focus on learning (La Porte and Cansolini 1991; Milosevic et al. 2016;
Roberts 1989).

Research Methods
The research context for this study is BP’s post-disaster activities following the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. BP is a ‘high-hazard organization’ because it engages in ‘potent activities
with the power to kill or maim’ (Gaba 2000, p. 85). These potent activities can create
catastrophic events (Carroll 1998), which often arise because of (1) the unpredictability or
unusual circumstances created by individuals and/or machines, (2) poor training, or (3)
management carelessness, all of which can produce disasters coupled with performance failures
(Perrow 1984). High-hazard organizations often operate in demanding contexts, including
extractive industries such as the petroleum industry; technology-intensive industries such as the
aeronautic industry; or highly-coordinated industries such as the transportation industry
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(Roberts 1989). Given our focus on resilient organizing post-disruptive and hazardous events,
BP’s activities following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is an appropriate context for the study.
On April 20, 2010, an explosion, or blowout, occurred on BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig.
Workers, in an attempt to save their lives, abandoned the burning rig and jumped into the
flaming ocean. Eleven workers were killed by the explosion and an additional 17 were injured
(Ingersoll et al. 2012). A series of response efforts to find and treat workers on the rig and
contain the spill ensued. The spill was contained in September 2010, after an estimated 4.9
million barrels of oil was discharged into the area. The oil spill reached the shoreline of all five
states on the Gulf coast (Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi and Florida), resulting in
contamination of over 55 miles of shoreline (Lozano 2010). Given the large-scale nature of this
disaster, many questioned whether BP could survive the disaster and ever return to its previous
operational and financial performance.
To better understand how organizations that embody resilient organizing build a new future
post-disaster, we collected conference call and presentation transcript data of BP executives
following the spill, from 2010-2012 inclusively, in addition to other archival documents (See
Table x. 1 for additional information on data sources and Figure x. 1 for the data collection and
analysis procedures). We followed previous research that emphasizes the critical role of human
capital and especially senior managers in resilient organizing (Lengnick-Hall et al. 2011) and
focused the analysis on how executives at BP organized for the future. We utilized MAXQDA
software to analyze transcripts. We coded the data following inductive thematic analysis of both
the semi-scripted and unscripted portions of the transcripts (Creswell 2012; Strauss and Corbin
1994). We adopted a categorical aggregation approach to data analysis (Creswell 2012; Stake
1995), identifying a collection of similar strands of data and allowing elevated themes to
emerge.
< Insert Table x. 1 about here >

5

< Insert Figure x. 1 about here >

Resilient Organizing and a New Path for the Future
In this study, we uncovered four related themes embodied in resilient organizing — the process
that created a space for BP to chart a path for a new and different future: learning from the
disaster, finding resolve, refocusing efforts and experiencing transformation through action.
Evidence of these themes is interwoven in the subsequent paragraphs as well as being provided
in Table x. 2. Learning from the disaster was the most salient and overarching finding, because
it demonstrated the organization’s ability to use the disaster as a learning opportunity through
which it moved forward renewed. Finding resolve enabled BP to reconcile its internal and
external relationships following the disaster. BP created a sense of urgency in order to refocus
on its strengths and identify how to proceed towards a new future. Enacting resilience enabled
BP to identify and serve stakeholders, and in doing so discover new opportunities for future
success. Through these activities embodied in resilient organizing, BP was able to navigate the
disaster, but also bounce back and beyond towards a new future. We depict our findings in
Figure x. 2.
< Insert Table x. 2 about here >
< Insert Figure x. 2 about here >
Preparing for the New Future: Learning from the Disaster through Resilient Organizing
Experiencing and navigating a disaster requires the organization to recognize that what’s been
done in the past cannot be acceptable when preparing for a new future (Weick 2010). In this
vein, the organization must use the disaster as a learning opportunity to foster renewal (Carroll
et al. 2002; Madsen 2008). For example, Madsen (2008) explored accidents in coal mining and
proposed that individuals create new knowledge as they gain both direct and vicarious
experience with minor accidents and major disasters — new knowledge that enables them to
6

handle future obstacles. This is in line with research that suggests that changes in internal and/or
external environments, such as disasters, represent chances for organizational renewal, which
‘requires managers to change their mental models in response to environmental changes’ (Barr
et al. 1993, p.16).
As depicted in Table x. 2 and Figure x. 2, we discover that learning was manifested in the way
the executives experienced and navigated the disaster. The oil spill appeared to humble BP
because, especially during the Q&A sessions, the executives used statements like ‘we don’t
know’ or ‘we’re not sure’ to temper responses to questions about the organization’s operations,
the environment or the market. In other words, we show that resilient organizing involves
tempered confidence (Radzevick and Moore 2011, p.103) in which confidence is ‘more muted,
marked by lower peak confidence levels and wider distributions’. Tempered confidence is
different from loss of confidence because BP believed it had a future post-disaster, but that
future would be different. BP acknowledged that its operations had faltered, resulting in
disaster. It demonstrated humility on the part of the organization, that it didn’t have all the
answers, and that, despite its best efforts, it was not invincible. This introduced a human,
imperfect element to the organization that was a necessary part of learning from the disaster to
prepare for a new future.
Executives often discussed ‘finding the silver lining in the disaster and using it as a learning
opportunity’, to build the resilience needed for the future. Learning from mistakes embodied in
resilient organizing enabled BP to address questions with regard to its ability to survive the
disaster in the period between the blowout in April 2010 and when the well was capped in
September 2010. Once BP survived the blowout, it turned its attention towards recovery from
the disastrous oil spill via opportunities to learn (Bandura 1990; Bohn 2002). This was evident
not just in the recognition executives paid toward the recovery efforts, but also in the consistent
message that BP had the ability to learn and make improvements as a result of the Deepwater
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Horizon oil spill, and that it could leverage and apply these improvements to other global
locations, positively impacting the future of the organization’s operations as a whole:
What people have done in the Company, has worked incredibly hard to take a step back from
drilling, how we manage our own activities, how we interact with contractors, have developed
a new set of voluntary drilling standards in the Gulf which will adopt much of that and use it
globally, and getting ready, and then approaching the authorities who I think value the work
that we're doing and they see the changes and the commitment to it, and as a result of that we
are step-by-step going back to work in the Gulf.
To prepare for a new future, the conversation moved away from what went wrong to what could
be gained and leveraged for a new future. This discussion encompassed not just learning from
the spill, but also how the spill fostered new relationships between BP and other organizations
in the industry, the government, and even seemingly unrelated industries, such as tourism and
fishing. Indeed, BP executives recognized that: ‘there is always more to do and in every crisis
there is an opportunity’ (BP 2010 Q2 Earnings). Thus, executives positively described how the
oil spill fostered a platform for change in the organization — change that can prepare the
organization for a new future through relationships with others:
BP is a company that has been tested to the utmost, but we have resilient committed
people. I believe we are equal to the test we face in this event that will simply underscore
our determination to run our operations that are safe, secure, enabled to delivery energy
for customers and value for shareholders (BP 2012 Q4 Earnings).
Building the New Future: Finding Resolve through Resilient Organizing
A large part of navigating the oil spill required BP to find resolve not only within the
organization, but also in its relationships with affected entities external to the organization.
Finding resolve encapsulates organizational efforts to reconcile wrongdoing in order to generate
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a new future. Indeed, an important facet of resilience is being able to right a wrong. This search
for resolution was consistently conveyed by the BP executives:
We deeply regret the impact of this incident, and we are committed to healing and
restoring the communities of the Gulf of Mexico, to finish immediate cleanup, to mitigate
the long-term environmental impacts and to make whole those whose livelihood has been
damaged (BP 2010 Q2 Earnings Q&A).
We provide evidence for this theme in Table x. 2, and depict its role in the process embodied
in resilient organizing in Figure x. 2.
The executives often referred to finding resolve as making commitments: internally to
operations or employees and externally to stakeholders and the environment. Internally, BP
sought to find resolve by making changes to its operations and searching for ways to make the
organization a better place for employees. The main contributors to the blowout on the
Deepwater Horizon rig and the subsequent oil spill was a lack of maintenance and upgrades to
the rig and its support systems, lack of procedural control and human error. As an organization,
BP incurred debilitating costs from the blown rig: amassing approximately $374 million in lost
revenues and the loss of 11 workers’ lives. Resilient organizing through finding resolve with
individuals working for BP enabled the organization to enact radical change in operations so
that the failures that contributed to the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon rig would not be
repeated. As indicated by one BP executive: ‘…we’re fundamentally a different company in
about how we manage risk and how the care that we take with our decisions. If you spend time
with any of our management team and employees, I know you'll feel that’ (BP 2011 Q3
Earnings Q&A).
Externally, BP sought to find resolve through commitments to stakeholders. In addition to lost
revenues and the loss of 11 lives, the oil spill deeply impacted the gulf coast ecosystem, from
fisheries to wetland wildlife to tourism (Ingersoll et al. 2012). Finding resolve by deepening its
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commitment to impacted external stakeholders was a common theme expressed by BP
executives throughout the data: ‘Following the accident we acted rapidly to fulfill our
commitments as a responsible party’ (BP 2010 Q4 Earnings). Resilience was important to
finding resolve because, at the time of the disaster and especially in the months following its
occurrence, BP came under scrutiny by many stakeholders. Resilience was critical to help the
organization stay committed to finding resolve by ‘righting the wrong’ created by the oil spill
with external and internal stakeholders.
Cultivating the New Future: Refocusing through Resilient Organizing
In order for BP to cultivate the new future post-disaster, a sense of urgency emerged to refocus
on the organization’s strengths and on where it excels (see Figure x.2 and Table x.2). In this
effort, BP funneled resources back to its core, refocusing on where it found success in the past
to cultivate its new future. Previous literature describes refocusing as realigning operations after
disaster and participating in ‘”active” thinking about how best to respond, asking themselves
what aspects they can control, what impact they can have, and how the breadth and duration of
the crisis might be contained’ (Margolis and Stoltz 2010,p. 4). We build on this insight and
illustrate how BP refocused on its strengths as a global organization and recommitted itself as
an industry leader with a new future. An executive described this as recommitment to quality:
‘we are not focused on being the largest player in any of our businesses, but of holding the
highest quality portfolio and operating it well. I believe this is beginning to show through in
our competitive results’ (BP 2010 Q4 Earnings).
Indeed, BP had amassed extensive experience and expertise by operating as an integrated
energy company with locations across the globe and an employee base of industry experts. It
subsequently leveraged this expertise and global reach as a necessary stepping stone to
cultivating a new future, as described by the executive: ‘BP has a portfolio of very strong
businesses and great professional teams around the globe to ensure that we will be back on the
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on the road to recovery’ (BP 2010 Q2 Earnings Q&A). The refocusing effort also encompassed
the commitment to identifying and improving what, to that point, wasn’t working well. Highhazard organizations, like BP, should be preoccupied with safety (Weick and Roberts 1993)
and achieve a state of high-reliability — something BP lacked before the disaster occurred.
Thus, a large part of the refocusing effort entailed reemphasizing safety and how instilling
mistake-free operations would help cultivate a new future for the organization. By refocusing
on what the organization hadn’t done well and improving its areas of weakness, it could be
repositioned to leverage its successes and recommit as an industry leader: ‘…[operations] must
be safe and reliable. Across BP, safety remains our number one priority’ (BP 2010 Q1
Earnings).
This refocusing effort fundamentally changed ‘business as usual’ for BP. The disaster required
BP to prepare for and build a new future. Through resilient organizing and by refocusing its
efforts via organizational changes such as 10-point plans, new safety measures and improved
documentation of operational processes, it could cultivate a new future that was markedly
different than the one pursued prior to the disaster. As described by a BP executive: ‘Our 10point plan provides the roadmap, how we will play to our strengths and be safer, stronger, and
simpler and more standardized’ (BP 2011 Q4 Earnings).
Committing to the New Future: Experiencing Transformation through Action
In order for BP to pursue a new future, it had to experience transformation by not just speaking
of a new future, but acting upon it. This required executives at BP to see the disaster as a way
to move forward renewed. Seeing the disaster as a way to move forward renewed helped BP
recognize that it could bounce back to be something greater than it was before (Youssef and
Luthans 2007). It wasn’t just about coming back or surviving but, rather, the executives saw
BP as a ‘phoenix rising from the ashes’: ‘I believe strongly that the strength of this team is the
way we see the opportunity to instill those lessons deeply into the fabric of our company, this
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will make BP a safer, stronger and more resilient company. And this is good business’ (BP
2010 Q4 Earnings).
As depicted in Figure x. 2 and Table x. 2, BP was confident that it could commit to a new future
by acting on its obligations to others. That is, rather than just emphasizing the commitment in
this stage of resilient organizing, the organization actualized its commitment through actions:
‘This program will reset our position and create a stronger performing portfolio, while at the
same time remove any worry about our financial strength’ (BP 2010 Q2 Earnings). This
sentiment — that transformation could only occur through action — was echoed by a BP
executive: ‘BP is a changing company as a result of what happened in 2010. I believe the
changes will be for the better. These are not just words: you can see that from our actions’ (BP
2010 Q4 Earnings).
Given its focus on actions that contributed to its commitment to a new future, BP executives
looked for and emphasized promising signs of resilient organizing to signify that the
transformation for the future was in fact taking place. One of the executives explained: ‘The
lubricants business…continued to deliver resilient profitability both year-on-year and compared
with last’ (BP 2012 Q2 Earnings). These signs led to BP distancing itself from the disaster on
one hand, and painting a picture for the renewed future via transformation on the other. In other
words, these turning points indicated that BP was purposefully committing to a new path for
the future. A BP executive described the critical nature of turning points:
So, we will have taken major steps forward on many fronts in a relatively short space of
time. Of course, as we said upfront this has increased some costs and reduced some
volumes, but these were short-term effects as we laid stronger foundations for the future.
This has brought us to a clear turning point (BP 2011 Q3 Earnings Q&A).
Resilient Organizing for the Future: Implications and Future Directions
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The experience and actions of BP executives post-disaster show that resilient organizing may
enable organizations to bounce back from a disaster and chart a path for a new future — a
process that has not been systematically explored to date. Our findings build on previous work
that points to the importance of learning (Weick and Sutcliffe 2011), leadership (Williams et
al. 2017) and resolution (Legnick-Hall et al. 2011) for organizing post-disaster and enabling the
organization to navigate it. We contribute to this area of research by developing a process model
embodied in resilient organizing that enables the organization to prepare for, build, cultivate
and commit to a new future. In doing so, we extend the literature in three important ways. First,
we illustrate the nature of resilient organizing in organizations in high-hazard contexts. Unlike
other industries, organizations operating in these contexts embody two important differentiating
characteristics: (1) they are often vital for the region they operate in due to the resources they
possess as well as the services they provide (Milosevic et al. 2016), and (2) they are capable of
experiencing disasters that can have far-reaching consequences (such as the oil spill discussed
here) (LaPorte and Consolini 1991). Consequently, many of these organizations build dynamic
structures that enable tight control on one hand, and responsive locales on the other (Milosevic et
al. 2016; Weick and Roberts 1993) that enable them to minimize opportunities for disaster to
occur. We contribute to this line of research by illustrating how organizations may bounce back
and beyond when disasters do occur via embodying resilient organizing. We emphasize learning,
resolution, resolve and transformation as key to the process embodied in resilient organizing.
Although we provide insights on resilient organizing in high-hazard contexts, one of the key
research questions emerging from our study is how does resilient organizing manifest in more
mainstream (i.e. non-hazardous) organizations? Understanding this may be particularly
important today when even failure-tolerant organizations experience constrained opportunities
to learn from mistakes when faced with relentless competitive pressures and increasing
customer expectations.
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Second, we show how resilient organizing enables the organization to create a path for a new
future by recognizing the organizational shortcomings that might have contributed to creating
the disaster. By viewing the disaster as a learning opportunity, organizations can bounce back
and beyond to experience transformation and commit to a new future. We show the process
embodied in resilient organizing as BP was grappling with the devastating consequences of its
own misjudgments — trying to make sense of what transpired while searching for ways to move
forward. Our process model demonstrates resilient organizing and how a disaster triggers an
organization to prepare for, build, cultivate and commit to a new future. However, given the
importance of resilient organizing, both in terms of avoidance of errors (Weick et al. 2008) and
bouncing back and beyond once those do occur, it may be important to explore the process
embodied in resilient organizing a priori rather than in the wake of the disaster. This may be
particularly important for organizations in high-hazard contexts where errors may have
devastating consequences for all involved.
Finally, we show how resilient organizing enables organizations to leverage and recombine
scarce resources when faced with a changing context (Rouse and Zietsma 2008). More
specifically, we show that resilient organizing creates a space where organizations are able to
identify which resources to use and how to leverage positive attributes to experience and
overcome the disaster. To this end, resilient organizing may enable the organization to not just
withstand the disaster, but also prepare for a future renewed. Thus, we emphasize that resilient
organizing enables organizations to experience, rather than fix, a disaster. In doing so, the
organization can use the disaster to bounce back and beyond to a new future. However, given
our focus on resilience in times of disaster, we have provided limited insight into the nature of
resilience once the organization has been renewed. To this end, a final research question we
suggest is: How do organizations leverage resilience for the future? More specifically, is
resilient organizing relevant only in disaster situations, or is it relevant in times of relative
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stability (i.e. positive future) (Osborn et al. 2002)? We hope that future studies will address
these questions and provide additional insight into the nature of resilient organizing.
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